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Abstract 
The costs of running pension schemes are believed to be significant and have the potential to take resources 
away from scheme members’ pensions. However, this study intended to explore the effect of operating costs on 
pension schemes which consist of administrative and investment costs which can substantially increase the cost 
of retirement security. This study therefore was motivated by the fact that trustees of the pension funds need to 
understand the impact of the operating costs on financial performance in Kenya. To meet the objectives of the 
study, a case study method was used. The study mainly used secondary data from 164 pension schemes for the 
past 3 years. The population of interest was the value of assets, investment returns, investment costs, 
administrative costs and other costs as indicated in the audited financial statements from the financial year 2007 
to financial year 2009. Stratified sampling technique was used to group the target population of 329 pension 
schemes into three groups (small, medium and large) which were drawn from the Kenyan Retirement Benefits 
Authority (RBA) register. Data on pension schemes for the past 3 years financial statements was analyzed using 
Return on Assets (ROA) as the key performance indicator to  ascertain the change in financial performance as a 
result of operating costs. The financial performance was done using financial ratios, such as, investment cost 
ratio and operating expense ratio were computed annually for each category.  Data was presented by use of 
tables for each ratio computed showing the annual average of the three financial years. Tabular presentation was 
used in trends analysis of each ratios and the year. The study finding on regression analysis shows that there was 
a strong inverse relationship between financial performance and investment management costs as well as 
administrative cost. The study recommends that trustees/authorities should monitor and regulate the operating 
costs incurred by the pension schemes. 
Keywords: Operating costs, Administrative costs, financial performance, occupational pension schemes 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The components determining the costs of pension provisioning are the quality of the pension schemes and the net 
rate of return on investments. However, operating costs which consist of administrative and investment costs can 
also substantially increase the cost of retirement security (Batema and Mitchell, 2004). Examples of the 
operating costs are the costs of policy development especially asset and liability management, data management 
systems and reporting. Investment costs include the wages of portfolio manager and analysts, brokerage fees and 
the cost of electronic trading facilities. The expert personnel required are pension administrators, actuaries, 
accountants, and legal staff and investment managers. Pension funds can outsource fund administration and 
investment to specialized companies such as insurance companies, thus gaining access to the necessary expertise, 
particularly for small firms, at relatively low costs (Bikker and De Dreu, 2009).  
A study published by the Dutch National Bank (2009) showed that the average cost per head for 
pension scheme administration went down as the number of members and assets increased. Large pension 
schemes are failing to take advantage of potential economies of scale to reduce their administration costs, 
so forcing investment teams to make better returns to fund their inefficiencies. Consolidation amongst 
smaller schemes would improve their efficiency and lower costs, but for larger schemes, joining with another 
would only compound the problem (Pfeuti, 2010). The Dutch National Bank report advised larger schemes to 
look into internal processes to lower costs and improve their service to members. The study also found that costs 
for administration, including audit fees and legal charges, for state and governmental schemes were up to 80% 
higher than the average. The study indicated that the administration costs of pension funds are very important in 
financial performance as they may erode the wealth accrued for retirement (Pfeuti, 2010). 
Financial Performance is a subjective measure of how well a firm can use assets from its primary mode 
of business and generate revenues that can be used to compare similar firms across the same industry or to 
compare industries or sectors in aggregation. Financial performance measures should be taken in aggregation 
(Avkiran, 1995). Line items such as revenue from operations, operating income or cash flow from operations can 
be used, as well as total unit sales. Pension scheme performance like other firms may at various times be 
reflected by financial outcomes, sales or market growth, client satisfaction or establishing a foundation upon 
which future growth may take place. Previous research shows that growth and profitability are contemporaneous 
and substitutable (Qian and Li, 2003) and they are positively related due to optimal size and efficient scale 
(Gupta, 1981; Mansfield, 1979). The direct data of profitability and costs of the pension scheme agents 
determines business performance (Dvir, Segev & Shenhar, 1993). 
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Pension funds perform a useful role in providing collective pensions for individuals.  
Therefore, the asset allocation of pension funds should be realigned with the risks of the liability 
structure. Furthermore, the valuation of the pension liabilities should be reconsidered in order to make sure that 
the assumptions made in valuing the future cash flows are matched with the reality of investment markets. 
Moreover, performance measurement systems of pension funds focus on investment managers as the primary 
objective of pension funds (Mansfield, 1979). 
1.1.1 Pension Schemes in Kenya 
According to Odundo (2003) Kenya has several types of schemes which offer social security which can be 
divided into three broad categories. These are public schemes, occupational schemes and individual schemes. 
The public schemes are established by Act of Parliament. The Occupational schemes are run by employers for 
their employees and are underwritten by private insurance companies. The individual schemes are private 
schemes designed for the employed, self-employed and/or for those in non-pensionable employment. The public 
schemes, occupational and individual schemes cover workers mainly in the formal sector. The pension schemes 
form the first pillar where membership is not optional but compulsory. The Occupational schemes form the 
second pillar where membership is either voluntary or mandatory and are privately managed. The voluntary 
schemes form the third pillar where membership is voluntary. The pillars are the basis of contribution and the 
distribution of benefits to the retirement benefit schemes (Chitembwe, 2007). According to the Central Bank of 
Kenya the pool of Kenya Pension savings has grown from Kshs. 176 billion in 2005 to Kshs. 313 billion in 2009 
feeding the equities and bond market where pension managers have become some of the single largest investors. 
Old Mutual Kenya (2007) also reported that pension schemes sector in Kenya amounted to approximately Kshs. 
212 billion, or the equivalent of 23% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Savings for retirement in Kenya are 
currently operated by statutory contributions under NSSF, sponsor-led schemes and formal retirement benefit 
sector which covers approximately 11% of the labour force (Kareithi, 2009). The Government of Kenya has 
recognised the importance of the retirement funds industry in boosting economic growth and in accelerating 
domestic savings which currently stands at a rate of approximately 13%. The legal framework of the industry is 
governed by the Retirement Benefits Act 1997.  The Retirement Benefits Authority is the regulator for the 
industry. The RBA objectives include rising of retirement coverage and to boost domestic savings to 25% (RBA, 
2007). 
In 1997, the Government of Kenya embarked on an overhaul of the retirement funds industry, 
previously plagued with the mismanagement and misappropriation of pension scheme assets. The Retirement 
Benefits Act was introduced in 1997 aimed specifically at regulating a market which had therefore lacked a 
harmonised legal framework. Under the RBA Act, the authority was formed with the objectives of regulating 
and supervising the establishment and management of retirement benefit schemes and protects the interest of 
members and sponsors of retirement benefits schemes. RBA also promotes the development of the retirement 
benefit sector and seeks to advise the Minister of Finance on national policy to be followed with regard to the 
retirement benefits sector (RBA, 2007). Under the Act, registered pension schemes are obliged to appoint a 
board of trustees, one third of whom must be elected by the scheme members, professional managers to manage 
the scheme assets and a custodian to hold the assets in safe-keeping. Additionally, schemes are obliged to 
produce audited accounts on an annual basis. Direct benefit schemes are further obliged to undergo actuarial 
review every 3 years. The Retirement Benefit Authority (RBA) has set guideline limits on the amount that can be 
invested in any particular asset class (RBA Act). The RBA provides trustee training workshops geared at 
educating trustees on their roles and responsibilities. The RBA has a dedicated website, containing important 
information on service providers, legislation and general information 
A report by Mutuku (2007) on the trends and challenges of pension schemes indicated that among the 
problems faced by pension industry in Kenya is high service providers’ expenses, inadequate returns, ability to 
meet pension promise requirements, and the need for credible fund manager performance. The problem facing 
Kenya’s pension scheme that will be focused on will be the fees paid to the service providers. This is because the 
efficacy of pension schemes depends in part on its operating costs that are charged by the service providers. High 
costs of administration may lead to less income on retirement and a low annual rate of return since the expenses 
are paid from the pension funds; especially on defined contribution schemes (Mutuku, 2007).  
In Kenya, scheme trustees are required to appoint administrators who are not associated in any way 
with the contracted fund manager and vice versa (RBA, 2010). By this the operating costs are expected to rise 
further as there is no standard rate of charges recommended by the authorities. Such operating costs including 
trustees’ fees, administration costs, custodian’s fees, audit fees and investment charges may risk the pension 
payouts. What guidelines do the service providers such as administrators and investment teams use to charge for 
the services? Some of the occupational pension schemes transfer their funds to Individual Retirement Benefits 
Schemes because they cannot manage to pay all the charges to the service providers. Inorder to manage the 
pension funds the schemes trustees need to evaluate how these costs affect its finances and return on investement 
as liabilities may become higher and the scheme end up liquidating. Research work done previously focused on 
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problems facing Kenya’s pension system (Nyakundi, 2008), but there is no research done on the effect of 
operating costs on financial performance of pension schemes. This study therefore aimed to find out how these 
operating costs affect the financial performance of the pension schemes in Kenya and to what extent 
 
2.2 Literature review 
2.2.1 Theory of contribution density 
The theory of contribution density states that the adequacy of contributory pensions depends on the contributions 
of the scheme (Valdes, 2007). Contribution density is defined as the share (present value of) earnings in the 
active phase of life on which the individual contributes to some pension scheme for old age (Salvador, 2008). 
Density can be far below 100% because the state is unable to or unwilling to impose the mandate to contribute 
on all jobs, especially on poor workers such as many in self-employment and small firms. For any given rate of 
turnover between covered jobs and other uses of time, average density falls when self-employment expands and 
when activity outside the labour force rises. The determinants of the effective rate of return offered by the 
pension plans include the earnings differential. This return is compared with the return offered by pure saving in 
the financial market, to determine the equilibrium density of contribution which affects the financial health of the 
pension fund (Valdes, 2007). The operating costs affect the scheme funds by reducing the annual rate of return. 
2.2.2 Agency theory 
Agency theory models the relationship between the principal and the agent. Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined 
an agency relationship as a “contract under which one or more person (pension members) engages another 
person (scheme managers) to perform some services on their behalf which involves delegating some decision 
making authority to the agent”. In the context of the pension scheme, a major issue is the information asymmetry 
between the fund managers and members of the pension scheme as the fund managers of the scheme have an 
information advantage. Voluntary or mandatory disclosures present an excellent opportunity to apply agency 
theory in the sense that fund managers who have better access to the pension schemes’ private information can 
make credible and reliable communication to the market to optimize the value of the pension funds. These 
disclosures include investment opportunities and the financing policies of the fund.  
Pension schemes with very few exceptions are not resourced to manage all their activities in-house. So 
they employ ‘agents’ in both advice roles such as investment consulting and delegated roles such investment 
managers. This exposes them to the ‘agency problem’ that agents’ interests may not coincide with those of the 
fund (Fields & Tirtiroglu, 1991). If opportunity allows, one of the most straight forward opportunistic actions 
agents can take is to secretly shift expenses, which they would normally bear, onto the principal. 
The major issue is that pension funds’ goals are tied to paying pensions, whereas agents may be more 
interested in managing their business in line with their own objectives. Furthermore, pension funds tend to use a 
wide array of professional firms because of the complexity of their activities and the interaction of a number of 
agents may not make up a cohesive ‘team’. The result has been that the costs of employing agents have been 
high. The share-ownership cost is the second problem of the current investment system. Pension funds have had 
good reasons to own equities but this view is complicated by what is meant by this ‘ownership’ (Steward, 1990). 
According to Vittas (2003), the operating and investment performance of Mauritius, occupational 
pension funds varied over time. The data which was derived from the annual reports of self-administered pension 
funds over the period 1997 to 2001 reported that operating expenses have been on a rising trend, relative to both 
annual contributions and average assets. Among the operating costs such professional fees for auditors and 
actuaries and levies paid to the Authority are met by the employees. Other costs are incurred by the employers 
who are sponsors. Vittas also reported that pension funds in Mauritius had low operating expenses in comparison 
to the levels found in Chile and other Latin American countries or to personal pension plans in the United 
Kingdom (Vittas, 2003). 
In Kenya, Kusewa (2007) studied the impact of regulation of the retirement benefits sector on financial 
performance of occupational schemes. The study was carried out on different pension schemes managed by three 
different insurance companies. From the study it was found that there is a linear relationship between the 
regulation of the retirement benefit sector and the financial performance of the occupational   pension schemes. 
Further, Njuguna (2008) determined the relationship between the agency costs and financial 
performance of pension schemes in Kenya. The population of the study was the pension registered by RBA 
where the sample comprised of forty pension schemes. Data for five years was extracted from the audited 
financial statements of the sampled pension schemes. The conclusion of the research was that there is a linear 
relationship between the agency costs and financial performance of pension schemes in Kenya. 
 
3.1 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
3.1.1 Summary Statistics of Data 
This section illustrates the summary of statistics of the schemes involved in the study.  
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Table 3.1 
Mean and Standard Deviation 
Scheme 
Category 
Sample  Mean Standard deviation 
  ROA ICR ACR AUCR TCR ROA ICR ACR AUCR TCR 
Small 
pension 
schemes 50 
          
0.07  
          
2.93  
          
0.07  
          
0.07  
          
0.08  
          
0.07  
          
2.93  
          
0.07  
          
0.07  
          
0.08  
Medium 
pension 
schemes 
 
 
34 
          
0.08  
          
3.24  
          
0.07  
          
0.03  
          
0.05  
          
0.08  
          
3.24  
          
0.07  
          
0.03  
          
0.05  
Large 
pension 
schemes 
 
 
33 0.08 3.05 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.50 0.01 0.00 0.01 
All pension 
schemes 
 
 
117 
          
0.10  
          
3.50  
          
0.06  
          
0.01  
          
0.03  
          
0.10  
          
3.50  
          
0.06  
          
0.01  
          
0.03  
ICR, ACR, AUCR and TRC represent the Operating Expense Ratios with respect to investment costs, 
administration costs, auditing costs, and trustee costs respectively. In terms of financial performance focusing on 
Return on Assets, it was revealed that large and medium pension schemes performed better than the small 
schemes at 0.08. However, in terms of deviation, medium pension schemes had higher fluctuations at 0.08.  
When comparing performance in terms of investment cost, medium pension schemes had a better 
performance at 3.24, followed by large pension schemes at 3.05. In terms of standard deviation, the study found 
out that large pension schemes had the lowest fluctuations at 0.50. On administration cost, auditing cost, and 
trustee cost, small pension schemes used their income, at a mean of 0.07, 0.07 and 0.08 respectively. Large 
pension schemes had low deviation on administration cost, auditing cost, and trustee cost. 
3.1.2 Effects of Investment Costs on Financial Performance 
Table 3.2  
Regression Analysis of Return on Assets against Investment Cost Ratio 
 All schemes Small schemes  Medium schemes  Large schemes  
Multiple R 0.860 0.728 485 0.961  0.865  
R Square 0.740  0.531  0.923  0.748  
Adjusted R Square 0.735  0.516  0.921  0.740  
Standard Error 0.016  0.005  0.004  0.005  
The coefficient of determination (R square-
2R ) measures the proportion of variability in a data set 
that is accounted for by a statistical model. In terms of financial performance with a consideration on investment 
costs, the study revealed that for all the schemes involved in the study, 74% of the variation in return on asset 
ratio is explained by variation in the investment cost. For small pension schemes, the ratio is at 53.1% while for 
large pension schemes the ratio is at 74.8%. A high proportion of 92.3% of the variation in investment cost 
explained the variation in return on asset obtained for medium schemes.   
Table 3.3 
 ANOVA for Investment Cost Ratio 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
All Schemes Regression 0.036 1 0.036 136.83 0.000 
Residual 0.013 115 0.000   
Total 0.048 116       
Small Schemes Regression 0.001 1 0.001 36.19 0.000 
Residual 0.000 48 0.000   
Total 0.002 49       
Medium 
Schemes 
Regression 0.006 1 0.006 373.11 0.000 
Residual 0.000 32 0.000   
Total 0.006 33       
Large Schemes Regression 0.002 1 0.002 94.83 0.000 
Residual 0.001 31 0.000   
Total 0.003 32       
As with investment cost in Table 4.4, the regression model is higher than the residual model which 
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means that investment cost does account too much of the variability on return on assets. Since sum of squares 
measures the variability of a data set, medium schemes exhibited the highest variation at 0.006, followed by 
large schemes at 0.002 and small schemes at 0.001. 
Coefficients of Independent Variables 
Table 3.4 
Coefficients on Investment Cost Ratio  
Model Unstandardized Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error 
All Schemes Constant 0.074 0.004 19.054 .000 
ICR -0.172 0.015 -11.698 .000 
Small Schemes Constant 0.079 0.002 45.041 .000 
ICR -0.115 0.019 -6.015 .000 
Medium 
Schemes 
Constant 0.135 0.004 35.973 .000 
ICR -1.644 0.085 -19.316 .000 
Large Schemes Constant 0.078 0.002 45.587 .000 
ICR -0.158 0.016 -9.738 .000 
Table 4.5 provides the quantification of the relationship between return on assets and investment cost. 
For small schemes, with every increase in a unit of investment cost, the return on asset decreases by 0.115 units. 
For medium schemes, with every increase in a unit of investment cost, the return on assets decreases by 1.644 
units, while for large schemes, with every increase in a unit of investment cost, the return on assets decreases by 
0.158 units. For all the pension schemes, with every increase in a unit of investment cost, the return on assets 
decreases by 0.172 units The Constant has no ‘practical’ meaning as it gives the value of return on assets when 
investment cost is equal to zero.  
The unstandardized coefficients are the coefficients of the estimated regression model. With respect to 
the return on assets, the following equations can be derived: 
ROA = 0.074 - 0.72 (ICR) + 0.015 (e) All pension schemes  
ROA = 0.079 -0.115 (ICR) + 0.019 (e) Small pension schemes   
ROA = 0.135 -1.644 (ICR) + 0.085 (e) Medium pension schemes   
ROA = 0.078 - 0.158 (ICR) + 0.016 (e) Large pension schemes   
Where e is the error term 
The study revealed that there is an inverse relationship between return on asset and investment cost. 
The t-test shows that medium schemes exhibited the strongest relationship.  
3.1.2 Effects of administrative Costs on Financial Performance 
Table 3.5  
Regression Analysis of Return on Assets against Administration Cost Ratio 
 All Pension 
Schemes 
Small Pension 
Schemes 
Medium Pension 
Schemes 
Large Pension 
Schemes 
Multiple R 0.888  0.860  0.865  0.820 
R Square 0.788 0.740  0.748  0.672  
Adjusted R 
Square 0.786  0.735  0.740 0.662  
Standard Error 0.013  0.016  0.005  0.007  
From Table 4.6, for all the 117 pension schemes involved in the study, 78.8% of the variation in return 
on assets is explained by the variation in administrative cost. For small pension schemes, variation in 
administrative cost ratio explains 74% of the variation in return of assets, while for medium pension schemes; 
this ratio is at 74.8%. On the other hand, for large pension schemes, variation in administrative cost to assets 
ratio explains 67.2% of the variation in return on asset. 
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Table 3.6 
ANOVA for Administration Cost Ratio 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
All Schemes Regression 0.069 1 .010 427.55 .002 
Residual 0.019 115 .001   
Total 0.088 116     
Small Schemes Regression 0.036 1 .036 136.83 .001 
Residual 0.013 48 .001     
Total 0.048 49       
Medium 
Schemes 
Regression 0.002 1 .001 94.83 .000 
Residual 0.001 32 .000     
Total 0.003 33       
Large Schemes Regression 0.005 1 .005 373.11 .002 
Residual 0.001 31 .003     
Total 0.006 32       
For all the schemes, lumped together or broken down to the various categories, except medium 
schemes, the study revealed that the regression model on the sum of squares, is more than residual. Thus the 
conclusion that the model does account for most of the variation on the dependent model, which is Return on 
Assets. This is confirmed by the level of significance being below our threshold of 0.05.  
Sum of squares measures the variability of a data set and from the results on Table 3.6, small pension 
schemes exhibited the highest variability at 0.036 followed by large pension schemes at 0.005 and medium 
pension schemes at 0.002. This can be explained by the big number of schemes (50) of the small pension 
schemes involved in the study.  
Table 3.7  
Coefficients on Administration Cost Ratio 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error 
All Schemes Constant 0.186 0.009 20.68 .000 
ACR -0.077  0.002  -48.99 .002 
Small Schemes Constant 0.172  0.015 11.70 .000 
ACR 
-0.072  0.004  -19.190 
.001 
Medium 
Schemes 
Constant 0.158  0.016 9.74 .000 
ACR -0.077  0.002  -48.56 .000 
Large Schemes Constant 1.644  0.085 19.32 .000 
ACR -0.119  0.003  -40.60 .001 
Table 3.7 provides the quantification of the relationship between administration cost and return on 
assets. For, small schemes, with every increase in a unit of administration cost, the return on asset decreases by 
0.072 units. For medium schemes, with every increase in a unit of administration cost, the return on assets 
decreases by 0.077 units, while for large schemes, with every increase in a unit of administration cost, the return 
on assets decreases by 0.119 units. For all the pension schemes, with every increase in a unit of administration 
cost, the return on assets decreases by 0.077 units, The Constant has no ‘practical’ meaning as it gives the value 
of return on assets when administration cost is equal to zero.  
The unstandardized coefficients are the coefficients of the estimated regression model. With respect to 
the return on assets, the following equations can be derived: 
ROA = 0.186- 0.077 (ACR) + 0.002 (e)   All schemes 
ROA = 0.172 - 0.072 (ACR) + 0.004 (e)   Small schemes 
ROA = 0.158 - 0.077 (ACR) +0.002 (e)   Medium schemes 
ROA = 1.644 -0.119 (ACR) + 0.003 (e)   Large schemes 
Where e is the error term 
There is an evidence of a negative relationship between return on asset ratio and administration cost 
ratio.  The t-test determines the strength of the relationship, in which case, medium pension schemes and large 
schemes exhibited the strongest relationship.  
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.8, No.1, 2017 
 
46 
3.1.3 Effects of Auditing Costs on Financial Performance 
Table 3.8  
Regression Analysis of Return on Assets against Auditing Cost Ratio 
 All schemes Small schemes  Medium schemes  Large schemes  
Multiple R  .275 .299 .015 .106 
R Square .076 .089 .000 .011 
Adjusted R Square .068 .070 -.031 -.021 
Standard Error .034 .030  .007  .052 
In terms of financial performance with a consideration on auditing costs, the study showed that for all 
the schemes involved in the study, 7.6% of the variation in return on asset ratio is explained by the variation in 
audit cost to assets ratio. For small pension schemes, the ratio is at 8.9% while for large pension schemes the 
ratio is just at1.1%. Interestingly, there was no relationship between auditing costs and return on asset amongst 
the medium pension schemes involved in the study. 
Table 3.9 
ANOVA for Auditing Cost Ratio 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
All Schemes Regression .011 1 .011 9.403 .003 
Residual .130 115 .001     
Total .141 116       
Small Schemes Regression .007 2 .004 4.242 .020 
Residual .039 47 .001     
Total .047 49       
Medium 
Schemes 
Regression .000 1 .000 .007 .932 
Residual .001 32 .000     
Total .001 1 .001 .355 .556 
Large Schemes Regression .084 31 .003     
Residual .085 32       
Total      
As with auditing cost in Table 3.9, the regression model is much lower than the residual model, except 
for large schemes, which means that auditing cost ratio does not account to much of the variability on return on 
assets.  The bulk of the variations in return on assets are explained by other residual variable not examined in the 
study. The significance level being above our threshold of 0.05 confirms the significance of auditing cost ratio to 
return on asset to be low and confirmed by the F test.  
Since sum of squares measures the variability of a data set, large schemes exhibited the highest 
variation at 0.084, followed by small schemes at 0.007. There was no variability of a data set for medium 
schemes. 
Table 3.10 
Coefficients on Auditing Cost Ratio 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error 
All Schemes Constant .080 .004 18.768 .000 
AUCR -.184 .060 -3.066 .003 
Small Schemes Constant .079 .009 9.327 .000 
AUCR -.173 .080 -2.171 .035 
Medium 
Schemes 
Constant .071 .002 31.300 .000 
AUCR .008 .093 .086 .932 
Large Schemes Constant .090 .015 6.088 .000 
AUCR -.601 1.009 -.596 .556 
With respect to the return on assets, the following equations can be derived: 
ROA = 0.080- 0.184 (AUCR) + 0.06 (e) All pension schemes  
ROA = 0.079 - 0.173 (AUCR) + 0.80 (e) Small pension schemes   
ROA = 0.071 + 0.008 (AUCR) + 0.093 (e) Medium pension schemes   
ROA = 0.090 - 0. 601 (AUCR) + 1.01 (e) Large pension schemes   
Where e is the error term. 
From the analysis there is a negative relationship between return on asset with auditing cost to assets 
ratio, with the exception of the relationship for all medium schemes.  
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3.1.4 Effects of Trustee Costs on Financial Performance 
Table 3.11 
Regression Analysis of ROA against Trustees’ Cost Ratio  
 All Schemes Small 
Schemes  
Medium Schemes  Large Schemes  
 Multiple R .317 .378 .423 .138 
R Square .100 .143 .179 .019 
Adjusted R Square .093 .125 .153 -.012 
Standard Error .03318 .02882 .00605 .05184 
The financial performance with regards to trustee costs showed that for all the schemes involved in the 
study, 10% of the variation in return on asset ratio is explained by the variation in trustee cost. For small pension 
schemes, 14.3% of the variation in return on asset ratio is explained by the variation in trustee cost while for 
large pension schemes the ratio is at1.9%. A high proportion of 17.9% of variation in auditing costs determined 
the variation in return on asset amongst the medium schemes.  
Table 3.12 
ANOVA for Trustees’ Cost Ratio 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
All Schemes Regression .014 1 .014 12.848 .000 
Residual .127 115 .001     
Total .141 116       
Small Schemes Regression .007 1 .007 8.011 .007 
Residual .040 48 .001     
Total .047 49       
Medium 
Schemes 
Regression .000 1 .000 6.983 .013 
Residual .001 32 .000     
Total .001 33       
Large Schemes Regression .002 1 .002 .606 .442 
Residual .083 31 .003     
Total .085 32       
The findings in Table 4.13 shows that the regression model is much lower than the residual model, 
which means that trustee cost ratio does not account too much of the variability on return on assets. The bulk of 
the variations in return on assets are explained by other residual variable that are not examined in this study. 
Since sum of squares measures the variability of a data set, small schemes exhibited the highest variation at 
0.007, followed by large schemes at 0.002. There was no variability of a data set for medium schemes. 
Table 3.13 
Coefficients on Trustees’ Cost Ratio 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error 
All Schemes Constant .084 .005 18.24 .000 
TCR -.202 .056 -3.58 .000 
Small Schemes Constant .083 .008 10.32 .000 
TCR -.193 .068 -2.83 .007 
Medium 
Schemes 
Constant .077 .002 33.48 .000 
TCR -.152 .058 -2.64 .013 
Large Schemes Constant .098 .021 4.61 .000 
TCR -.655 .841 -.78 .442 
With respect to the return on assets, the following equations can be derived: 
ROA = 0.084 - 0.202 (TCR) + 0.056 (e) All pension schemes  
ROA = 0.083- 0.193 (TCR) + 0.068 (e) Small pension schemes   
ROA = 0.077 - 0.152 (TCR) + 0.058 (e) Medium pension schemes   
ROA = 0.098- 0.655 (TCR) + 0. 841(e) Large pension schemes   
Where e is the error term. 
There is a negative relationship between return on asset with trustee cost on all categories of schemes. 
The t-test determines the strength of the relationship, in which case medium schemes exhibited the strongest 
relationship.  
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3.1.5 Effects of Operating Costs on Financial Performance 
Table 3.14 
Regression Analysis of ROA against TCR, ACR, AUCR, ICR 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
All Schemes 0.728 0.531 0.516 0.005 
Predictors: (Constant), TCR, ACR, AUCR, ICR 
The financial performance with regards to the combination of trustee costs, audit cost, administration 
cost and cost of investment showed that for all the schemes involved in the study, 53.1% of the variation in 
return on asset ratio is explained by the variation in operating costs.  
Table 3.15 
ANOVA for TCR, ACR, AUCR, ICR 
Model   Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
All Schemes 
  
  
Regression 0.00346 4 0.00346 63.59144 5.29E-09 
Residual 
0.001687 
112 
5.44E-05   
Total 0.005146 116       
Predictors: (Constant), TCR, ACR, AUCR, ICR 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
The findings shows that the regression model is higher than the residual model, which means the 
combination of trustee costs, audit cost, administration cost and cost of investment ratios does account to much 
of the variability on return on assets. The rest of the variations in return on assets are explained by other residual 
variable that are not examined in this study.  
Table 3.16 
Coefficients on TCR, ACR, AUCR, ICR 
Model   Unstandardized Coefficients t Sig. 
    B Std. Error     
All Schemes 
  
  
  
  
(Constant) .074 .073 45.041 0.000 
ICR -0.115 .023 -6.015 0.000 
ACR -.124 .098 -1.264 0.000 
AUCR -.034 .111 -.311 0.000 
TCR -.092 .148 -.620 0.000 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
This table shows the coefficients of the regression line. It states that the expected return on asset is 
equal to -0.115 * ICR + 0.074 + -.124 * ACR + 0.074 + -.034 * AUCR+ 0.074 +-.092 * TCR +0.074. 
 
4.0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMEDATIONS 
The objective of the study was to determine how the operating costs affect the financial performance of 
occupational pension schemes in Kenya. Over the three year period (2007-2009), administrative costs and 
investment management costs were vital in determining the financial performance of pension schemes, no matter 
the size of the scheme fund. 
Carrying out regressions tests, it was found out that there was a strong relationship between financial 
performance and investment management costs as well as administrative cost. It was revealed that 78.8% of the 
variation in administrative cost ratio explained financial performance in terms of return on assets for all the 
schemes. Still, 74% of the return on asset ratio was explained by investment costs. However, there was a weak 
relationship between financial performance and auditing costs, since only 7.6% of the return on asset ratio was 
explained by auditing cost. Similarly, there was a weak relationship between financial performance and trustee 
cost, given that only 10% of the return on asset ratio was explained by trustee cost. 
On carrying out an analysis of variance tests (ANOVA) it was confirmed that the  regression model 
could be relied on for administrative cost and investment management costs, except for auditing and trustee costs, 
given that the residual on the sum of squares was less than the regression model. Therefore the model does 
account for most of the variation on the dependent variable, which is financial performance.  
The analysis of the coefficients of independent Variables revealed that with every increase in a unit of 
investment cost, the return on asset decreased by a bigger margin amongst the medium schemes by 1.644 units, 
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followed by large schemes by 0.158 units. For large schemes, with every increase in a unit of administration 
costs, auditing costs, and trustee costs, the return on assets decreased by bigger margins of 0.119 units, 0.601 
units and 0.655 units respectively, as opposed to small and medium pension schemes. The t-test determined that 
large schemes exhibited the strongest direct relationship between return on asset and investment cost ratio. On 
administration, auditing and trustee costs large schemes exhibited the strongest inverse relationship.  
Operating costs are critical for any business organization due to the need of maximizing returns to 
various organizational components, and also because of the impact such a decision has on a firm's ability to deal 
with its competitive and volatile environment effectively. Performance of pension schemes in financial terms is 
normally expressed in net interest earned, return on investment, and return on assets.  
The findings indicate that operating costs ratio accounts for a big percentage of financial performance 
of all types of pension schemes. As such, high costs of administration and investments led to less income on 
retirement and a low annual rate of return since the expenses are paid from the pension funds. On the other hand, 
auditing and trustee costs do not account too much of the variability on return on assets, indicating a weak 
relationship between these costs and the financial performance of the pension schemes. The study recommends 
that trustees/authorities should monitor and regulate the operating costs incurred by the pension schemes. 
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